The Ressurection of Xi Jinping?

The birds say tomorrow Xi Jinping will make his first public appearance and make a speech. The official story is now that he “hurt his back swimming”. Hence we can gather his back injury will be obvious. He has been “told by his doctor to remain in bed”. How will he give this speech, through what "means"? Great meaning has also being read into the statement issued “jointly” (but through “various means”) by Zhu Rongji, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. They were all listed together as giving condolences to the family of the dead Huang Rong. It is said these three men have become much closer because of this "attack".

Xi Jinping's Father, Tibet, and the son

Insight: Does China's next leader have a soft spot for Tibet? Thursday, August 30, 2012 5:07 p.m. EDT By Benjamin Kang Lim and Frank Jack Daniel BEIJING/DHARAMSALA (Reuters) - For decades, Beijing has maintained that the Dalai Lama is a separatist, but Tibet's exiled spiritual leader once had a special relationship with the father of Xi Jinping, the man in line to become China's next president. Few people know what Xi, whose ascent to the leadership is likely to be approved at a Communist Party congress later this year, thinks of Tibet or the Dalai Lama. But his late father, Xi Zhongxun, a liberal-minded former vice premier, had a close bond with the Tibetan leader who once gave the elder Xi an expensive watch in the 1950s, a gift that the senior party official was still wearing decades later. The Dalai Lama, 77, recalls the elder Xi as "very friendly, comparatively more open-minded, very nice" and says he only gave watches back then to those Chinese officials he felt close to. "We Tibetans, we get these different varieties of watch easily from India. So we take advantage of that, and brought some watches to some people when we feel some sort of close feeling, as a gift like that," the Dalai Lama said in an interview in the Indian town of Dharamsala, a capital for Tibetan exiles in the foothills of the Himalayas. The Dalai Lama gave the watch to the elder Xi in 1954 during an extended visit to Beijing. Xi was one of the officials who spent time with the young Dalai Lama in the capital where he spent five to six months studying Chinese and Marxism. The Dalai Lama fled to India five years later, after a failed uprising against Communist rule, but as late as 1979, Xi senior was still wearing the watch, the make and style of which the Dalai Lama can no longer remember. Xi senior was a dove in the party, championing the rights of Tibetans, Uighurs and other ethnic minorities. He also opposed the army crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen student protests and was alone in criticizing the sacking of liberal party chief Hu Yaobang by the Old Guard in 1987. Xi senior died in 2002. The Dalai Lama has never met Xi junior but his fondness for the father is, for some, a sign that China's next leader may adopt a more reformist approach to Tibet once he formally succeeds President Hu Jintao next March. Some expect him to be more tolerant of Muslim Uighurs in the western region of Xinjiang, and also of Taiwan, the independently ruled island that China has vowed to take back, by force if necessary. "To understand what kind of leader Xi Jinping will be, one must study his father's (policies)," said Bao Tong, one-time top aide to purged party chief Zhao Ziyang. Bao was jailed for seven years for sympathizing with student-led demonstrations for democracy centered on Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989. "No (Chinese) Communist will betray his father," he added. LIKE FATHER, LIKE SON? Xi senior is looked on favorably by China's leaders with plans already made to commemorate his 100th birth anniversary in mid-October next year with a ceremony at the Great Hall of the People and editorials and commentaries in state media eulogizing him, sources with ties to the leadership said. But even if Xi junior wants to pursue a reform agenda, he is likely to bide his time. "The key is whether Xi Jinping feels confident of his power consolidation," said Lin Chong-Pin, a former Taiwan defense minister and China policy-maker who now teaches at Taipei's Tamkang University. Lin added, however: "There will be a more tolerant policy not only (towards) Tibet, but also Xinjiang." Taiwan, the democratic island Beijing claims as its own, may be the model for reconciliation with Tibet. "Every generation of (Chinese) leaders must resolve problems left over from the previous generation," a source with leadership ties said. "For Hu, it was Taiwan," the source added, referring to Hu mending fences with the island after his predecessor, Jiang Zemin, threatened it with war games in the run-up to its first direct presidential elections in 1996. "For Xi, it's Tibet," the source said. Asked if Xi might take a different tack on Tibet, a retired party official who used to work in Tibet said: "There has to be new thinking ... He (Xi) is surely aware of the problems." "More and more government spending, more and more security, is not going to buy enduring stability in Tibet," the official said, referring to China pouring billions of yuan to develop Tibet, including opening a railway in 2006 linking it with the rest of China, and a crackdown in the wake of the unrest. "The high-pressure policies can't continue forever," the official said, asking not to be identified and adding that these were his personal views. CARDS HELD CLOSE Xi has played his cards close to his chest and little is publicly known about his policies. Like Hu, he will be no political strongman, and will have to rule by consensus as the first among equals. If Hu stays on as military chief, Hu may continue to hold sway over major policies, but is unlikely to oppose detente. "Hu will not be an obstacle to (any) reconciliation" moves, a second source with leadership ties said. Initially, Hu sought to make up for his decision to crush riots in Tibet in 1989 by issuing a decree to "protect Tibetan culture" in the early 2000s, but was taken aback when the Dalai Lama accused China of "cultural genocide". China has defended its iron-fisted rule in Tibet, saying the region suffered from dire poverty, brutal exploitation of serfs and economic stagnation until 1950 when Communist troops "peacefully liberated" it and introduced "democratic reforms" in 1959. Tensions over the issue are at their highest in years after a spate of protests and self-immolations by Tibetan activists, which have led to an intensified security crackdown. Fifty-one Tibetans have set themselves alight since 2009. In the event the Dalai Lama dies in exile, it could radicalize exiled Tibetan youth who have clamored for independence and are frustrated with his "middle way" approach that advocates autonomy within China. It could create a rallying point for Tibetans disgruntled with Communist rule and leave a destabilizing leadership vacuum. "They (Chinese government) hope Tibet's political problem can be basically resolved once the Dalai Lama passes away," said Wang Lixiong, an author and expert on Tibet who has met the Dalai Lama several times. Instead, Wang added, "the Dalai Lama's death could spark massive protests and even rioting." "NORMAL HEARTS" The outbreak of rioting in Tibet in 2008 ahead of the Beijing Olympics and a subsequent crackdown, which in turn sparked the self-immolations, may have prevented Hu from carrying out any reversal of China's hard-line policy on Tibet. At the time of the riots, Xi commented: "We should have normal hearts" - a remark that was in stark contrast to insults rained on the Dalai Lama by the region's then Communist Party boss, Zhang Qingli, who called the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize winner a "jackal in Buddhist monk's robes" with "the face of a human and the heart of a beast". Zhang was not alone. Many Chinese party, government and military officials and many ordinary Chinese are convinced the 2008 unrest was a Western plot to demonize Beijing before the Games and try to split Tibet from China. But tempers appear to have cooled a bit. Hu is maneuvering to promote one of his closest allies - Inner Mongolia party boss Hu Chunhua who speaks Tibetan, a rarity among Chinese officials - to the party's inner sanctum, two independent sources said, in a bid to retain clout after retiring. The two Hus are not related. In a sign the party may at times be willing to reverse bad decisions or policies, it backed down recently after liberal intellectuals slammed it for forcing Tibetan Buddhist monasteries to put up portraits of Mao and other leaders, Columbia University Tibetologist Robbie Barnett said, adding that local officials now say this is voluntary. Xi may have more to gain than lose from resuming talks with the Dalai Lama's envoys, but this may not happen anytime soon. "They probably will take very small, incremental steps. They cannot take big steps," said Lin, the Taiwan-based academic. Many challenges lie ahead. "The talks process could start again at any point, we don't know. We shouldn't rule it out even though it looks very negative at the moment," Robbie Barnett, a Tibetologist at Columbia University, said in a telephone interview. "He may have to prove that he's very tough ... so it could make it quite difficult for Xi. He could risk heavy attack from hardliners. It's quite complicated for him." But Robert Lawrence Kuhn, author of "How China's Leaders Think", was more optimistic. "He is a very practical, pragmatic, very down-to-earth kind of person," said Kuhn who has met Xi half a dozen times. "I don't think he has an overblown sense of his own person, which to me is very important. People could rally around him." The Dalai Lama has said he hopes Xi will usher in a "realistic" and more open approach to Tibet, in the same way Deng Xiaoping introduced market reforms in the late 1970s that turned China into an economic powerhouse from a backwater. After more than 50 years of confrontation with Beijing, the Dalai Lama is cautious but hopeful. "I can't say for definite, but according to many Chinese friends, they say the new, coming leadership seems more lenient," he said in an interview in his audience room which was decorated with Buddhist paintings and a bust of Mahatma Gandhi. He said there had been a stream of visitors to Dharamsala from China, including people who told him they had connections with senior Communist Party leaders. "These are very, very encouraging signs," he said. "No formal talks, but there are sort of signs among the Chinese officials or top leaders." Tibetan exiles see other small signs that Xi could take a softer line on Tibet - his wife is a Buddhist, and Xi went out of his way in 2006, while party boss of Zhejiang province, to host the first World Buddhist Forum in the provincial capital. A batch of U.S. diplomatic cables obtained and published by WikiLeaks last year said the Dalai Lama had "great affection" for Xi senior, and that Xi junior was quite taken with Buddhist mysticism at one point early in his career. In July last year, Xi visited Tibet and pledged to crack down on the separatist "Dalai clique" and "completely smash any plot to destroy stability in Tibet and jeopardize national unity". But a Western diplomat in Beijing cautioned that this was standard language and should not be construed to be hard-line. "No one wins prizes for saying the Dalai is ok," he said. But many exiles are skeptical. "I do not expect Xi junior to be like his father because he is facing a completely different situation, but I hope he can be different (from Hu Jintao)," said Khedroob Thondup, a nephew of the Dalai Lama who visited China more than 10 times with his father, Gyalo Thondup, as unofficial envoys of the Dalai Lama. Another nephew, Tenzin Taklha, who is also a secretary to the Dalai Lama, said: "Even if it does happen it won't be substantial, just to show the world the door is open again." The Dalai Lama, too, has yet to be convinced that Beijing will soften its stance on Tibet - even if Xi turns out to have the same moderate inclination as his father - and says political reformers sometimes do not last long in the Communist Party. "These realistic people sometime live a very short life." (Additional reporting by John Chalmers in DHARAMSALA and Chris Buckley in BEIJING; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan and Mark Bendeich)

US 2009 Cables on Xi Jinping

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 BEIJING 003128 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2034 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL CH TW SUBJECT: PORTRAIT OF VICE PRESIDENT XI JINPING: "AMBITIOUS SURVIVOR" OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1. 4 (b/d). Summary ------- ¶1. (C) According to a well connected Embassy contact, Politburo Standing Committee Member and Vice President Xi Jinping is "exceptionally ambitious," confident and focused, and has had his "eye on the prize" from early adulthood. Unlike many youth who "made up for lost time by having fun" after the Cultural Revolution, Xi "chose to survive by becoming redder than the red." He joined the Party and began mapping out a career plan that would take him to the top of the system. In our contact's view, Xi is supremely pragmatic and a realist, driven not by ideology but by a combination of ambition and "self-protection." Xi is a true "elitist" at heart, according to our contact, believing that rule by a dedicated and committed Communist Party leadership is the key to enduring social stability and national strength. The most permanent influences shaping Xi's worldview were his "princeling" pedigree and formative years growing up with families of first-generation CCP revolutionaries in Beijing's exclusive residential compounds. Our contact is convinced that Xi has a genuine sense of "entitlement," believing that members of his generation are the "legitimate heirs" to the revolutionary achievements of their parents and therefore "deserve to rule China." ¶2. (C) Xi is not corrupt and does not care about money, but could be "corrupted by power," in our contact's view. Xi at one point early in his career was quite taken with Buddhist mysticism, displaying a fascination with (and knowledge of) Buddhist martial arts and mystical powers said to aid health. The contact stated that Xi is very familiar with the West, including the United States, and has a favorable outlook toward the United States. He also understands Taiwan and the Taiwan people from his long tenure as an official in Fujian Province. End Summary. Introduction ------------ ¶3. (C) A longtime Embassy contact and former close friend of Politburo Standing Committee Member and Vice President Xi Jinping has shared with PolOff his first-hand knowledge of Xi's family background, upbringing, early adulthood, and political career, as well as his impressions and assessments of Xi's personality and political views. The information was acquired in multiple conversations over a two-year period 2007-2009. The contact is an American citizen of Chinese descent who teaches political science at XXXXXXXXXXXX " Fifteen-Year Relationship with Xi --------------------------------- ¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX and Xi Jinping were both born in 1953 and grew up in similar circumstances. According to the professor, they lived with other sons and daughters of China's first-generation revolutionaries in the senior leaders' compounds in Beijing and were groomed to become China's ruling elite. The professor did not know Xi personally until they had both reached their late teens, when the professor began to hear about Xi from the professor's best friend, XXXXXXXXXXXX, who was later sent to the same village as Xi in Shaanxi province during the Cultural Revolution. (Note: According to the professor, Zhou Sanhua's father was a former editor-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Daily.) By the time the professor and Xi had returned separately from the countryside, they had come to know each other personally, initially through Zhou Sanhua's introduction, and maintained a relationship for the next 15 years (ca. 1972 to 1987), even though their lives and careers took markedly different paths. Revolutionary Fathers --------------------- ¶5. (C) Xi's father, Xi Zhongxun, was a communist guerilla leader in northwest China in the 1930s, when Mao and the CCP leaders reached Yan'an at the end of the Long March. Xi Zhongxun was one of the few local leaders to survive later purges, siding with the Mao Zedong faction and rising quickly through Party ranks to become a Vice Premier in the 1950s while still in his thirties. According to the professor, Xi Zhongxun was the youngest Vice Premier among the early generation of CCP leaders. Despite his association with Mao's group, said the professor, Xi Zhongxun was also "good friends" with Deng Xiaoping and was "actually closer to Deng than to Mao." BEIJING 00003128 002 OF 006 ¶6. (C) The professor's father was also an early revolutionary and contemporary of Mao, from a neighboring county to Mao's in Hunan province. The professor's father participated in the revolution periodically but also spent time in Japan and Hong Kong, distinguishing himself as a labor leader. In 1949, according to the professor, his father agreed to return to Beijing at Mao's insistence and became the PRC's first Minister of Labor and a member of the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Standing Committee. ¶7. (C) Despite Communist Party rhetoric regarding the creation of a "classless" society, the professor described, the pre-Cultural Revolution society and leadership compounds in which he and Xi Jinping grew up were, ironically, the "most precisely class-based mini-society ever constructed." Everything was determined by one's "internal party class status," the professor asserted, including the kindergarten one attended, the place where one shopped, and the type of car one could own. All of these "benefits" were determined by Party rank, such as Politburo Standing Committee member, Vice Minister, or Central Committee member. One's every action, every day, was in some way an indication of one's "class" status, the professor stated. The children of this revolutionary elite were told that they, too, would someday take their rightful place in the Chinese leadership. All of this came to an end in the Cultural Revolution, the professor said, but consciousness of membership in an entitled, elite generation of future rulers has remained among most of the members of this class. Cultural Revolution and Return to Beijing ----------------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Both Xi Zhongxun and the professor's father were purged during the Cultural Revolution and spent time in prison, according to the professor. (Note: Xi Zhongxun was purged in the early 1960s, several years before the Cultural Revolution began, but things got worse for him and his family once the Cultural Revolution started.) The professor's father was falsely accused of supporting Liu Shaoqi and spent most of the Cultural Revolution years (1966-1976) in prison. Both Xi Zhongxun and the professor's father were later rehabilitated when Deng Xiaoping returned to power. Xi was rehabilitated by Deng in 1978 and was appointed by Deng as Party Secretary in Guangdong in the 1980s. ¶9. (C) In the early 1970s, the circle of youthful friends, including Xi Jinping and the professor, managed to return to Beijing from the countryside. The professor described themselves as "fugitives" of one kind or another. The professor himself served prison time and spent "years on the run" due to his father's status as a "counter-revolutionary." At this time, the professor said, he knew Xi, but they did not spend a great deal of time together. ¶10. (C) The professor said that he and others found dramatically different ways to "survive" the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. While the professor and his closest circle of friends descended into the pursuit of romantic relationships, drink, movies and Western literature as a release from the hardships of the time, Xi Jinping, by contrast "chose to survive by becoming redder than the red." (Note: The professor commented that, in a continuation of his attempt to deal with the Cultural Revolution, the professor eventually decided to "flee" China and pursue graduate study -- and a new life -- in the United States.) Unlike the professor and others who shared his Cultural Revolution experience in rural villages, Xi turned to serious politics upon his return to Beijing, joining the CCP in 1974 while his father was still in prison. The professor and his friends were reading DeGaulle and Nixon and "trying to catch up for lost years by having fun," while Xi was reading Marx and laying the foundation for a career in politics. Xi even went off to join a "worker-peasant-soldier revolutionary committee" (note: a label given provincial governing units during the Cultural Revolution), after which the professor had presumed he would never see Xi again. It was an "open secret," the professor said, that it was through the "worker-peasant-soldier revolutionary committee" that Xi got his "bachelor's education." The professor said Xi's first degree was not a "real" university education, but instead a three-year degree in applied Marxism. (Note: Xi's official biography provides no information on Xi between his assignment to Yanchuan county, Shaanxi province, in 1969, and 1975, when, it states, he became a student at Tsinghua University, graduating in 1979.) Neighbors, 1977-1982 -------------------- BEIJING 00003128 003 OF 006 ¶11. (C) When Xi and the professor's fathers were rehabilitated following the Cultural Revolution, the professor said, their respective families were relocated to the "Nanshagou" housing compound in western Beijing, directly across from Diaoyutai. The professor opened his Nanshagou apartment door one day in 1977 and there was Xi, standing across the hall from him. The two friends lived directly across from one another and, the professor said, talked almost daily for the next five years. Xi became a PLA officer "and wore his uniform every day," while the professor became a student at Beijing Shifan Daxue (Beijing Normal University). There were many prominent leaders in Nanshagou, including Wang Daohan, Jiang Zemin's mentor. Jiang frequently rode his bike there, and Jia Qinglin (currently Politburo Standing Committee member) also had a connection to Wang from that time, the professor said. Sporadic Contact, 1982-1987 --------------------------- ¶12. (C) From 1982 to 1987, the professor only saw Xi periodically, most memorably during a visit to Xiamen in the mid-1980s, where Xi was serving as a local official, and in 1987 when Xi visited the professor in Washington, D.C. In Xiamen, Xi treated the professor like royalty, but they did not spend much time together during the professor's visit there, and Xi said very little of substance. The professor, in turn, hosted Xi in Washington, D.C., where the professor was a graduate student. Xi's 1987 visit to the United States was the last time the two men met face to face. The last time the professor spoke with Xi was when his father, Xi Zhongxun, passed away several years ago, at which time the two spoke briefly over the phone when the professor called to offer his condolences. Xi was serving as the Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province at the time. Xi's Family ----------- ¶13. (C) Xi was the middle child in a family of three children that included an older sister and a younger brother, all of whom were apparently from his father's second marriage, according to the professor. Xi's older sister, Xi An'an, at some point left China for Canada, and as far as the professor knows, still resides there. Xi An'an's husband was in the PLA, the professor said. Xi's younger brother, Xi Yuanping, moved to Hong Kong when it was under British rule. The last time the professor saw Xi Yuanping was in the 1980s, at a time when Xi's father Xi Zhongxun was still Party Secretary in Guangdong province. The brother had become both obese and very wealthy, the professor said, sporting "expensive jewelry and designer clothing." The professor has lost contact with him since. (Note: Unofficial biographies published in Hong Kong claim Xi had other siblings as well.) Marriage and Divorce -------------------- ¶14. (C) Xi Jinping's first marriage was to Ke Xiaoming, the daughter of China's 1978-1983 ambassador to Great Britain, Ke Hua. According to the professor, Ke Xiaoming was elegant and well educated. The couple initially lived with Xi's parents in the Nanshagou housing compound, but as his father's political fortunes rose, his parents moved to a new house in "East" Beijing, near the Drum Tower and close to the houses of Deng Xiaoping and Yang Shangkun, leaving the young couple to themselves in the Nanshagou apartment. The couple fought "almost every day," the professor said, and the marriage ended when Ke Xiaoming returned to England and Xi refused to go with her. The professor remarked that he thought Xi's "distant" quality contributed to the couple's divorce. He noted that he had watched Xi "drift" further and further from Ke Xiaoming, until she finally left for England. There was, "of course," no way that Xi would go with her, the professor said. Xi later married a famous PLA singer. Xi's Early Career: Single-Minded Pursuit of Power --------------------------------------------- ----- ¶15. (C) According to the professor, Xi was always "exceptionally ambitious" and had his "eye on the prize" from the very beginning. Once Xi had returned from his education in the worker-soldier-peasant revolutionary committee, he carefully laid out a career plan that would maximize his opportunities to rise to the top levels of the Party hierarchy, first becoming a PLA officer in the late 1970s and then serving in a variety of provincial leadership positions, progressively rising through the ranks. By 1979, Xi was on the staffs of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC), serving as an assistant to the CMC Secretary General and later Minister of National Defense BEIJING 00003128 004 OF 006 (1982), General Geng Biao, a revolutionary comrade of his father's. The professor said he had the impression that Geng Biao had helped Xi Jinping get the PLA job, and that Xi Zhongxun had, in turn, given Geng's daughter a position in Guangdong when he was Party Secretary there. ¶16. (C) According to the professor, Xi subsequently became even more serious in plotting a career path to the top. By all appearances, with his father having been politically rehabilitated and rapidly regaining his power, Xi Jinping could have continued to rise quickly in the Central Party apparatus. Xi, however, reasoned that in the long run, staying in Beijing would limit his career potential. Xi told the professor that staying with Geng Biao would eventually shrink his power base, which would ultimately rest primarily on his father's and Geng's networks and political support. Moreover, in time, people would turn against him if he stayed in the Center. ¶17. (C) So in a calculated move to lay the basis for a future return as a Central leader, Xi asked for a position in the countryside and, in 1982, became a local official in Shijiazhuang, the capital of Hebei province. Xi later became the Deputy Party Secretary in Zhengding county, also in Hebei. Xi told the professor at the time that he "would be back one day." (Note: Xi later served for many years in Fujian province, becoming Governor in 2000, then moving to Zhejiang province in 2002 to be Party Secretary, and then to Shanghai as Party Secretary in 2007. He was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee at the 17th National CCP Congress in October 2007 and was appointed Vice President at the National People's Congress in March 2008.) ¶18. (C) Xi told the professor at the time that going to the provinces was his "only path to central power." Xi thought it was important to know people in the Central Organization Department and to keep his eyes on the Center, even as he worked his way up the ladder as a local official. According to the professor, Xi "had promotion to the Center in mind from day one." Xi knew how to develop personal networks and work the system, first using his father's networks and later building his own. Xi the Person ------------- ¶19. (C) The professor offered his personal assessment -- based on their similar upbringing and his long association with Xi during his formative years -- of Xi's personality and political views. Although he had not seen Xi in person in more than 20 years, "one cannot entirely escape one's past," he asserted, and "Xi does not want to." The professor on repeated occasions painted a portrait of Xi Jinping as an ambitious, calculating, confident and focused person who in early adulthood demonstrated his singleness of purpose by distinguishing himself from his peers and turning his attention to politics even before the Cultural Revolution had concluded. The professor marveled that Xi joined the Communist Party while his father still languished in a Party prison for alleged political crimes. At the time, the professor and his friend Zhou felt "betrayed" by Xi's embrace of the CCP, but both realized this was one way to "survive." Xi chose to "join the system" to get ahead. Although Xi never said so explicitly, he sent a message that, in China, there was a better way forward than what the professor had chosen: namely, do not give up on the system. Xi was reserved and detached and "difficult to read," said the professor. He had a "strong mind" and understood power, but "from day one, never showed his hand." ¶20. (C) Unlike those in the social circles the professor ran in, Xi Jinping could not talk about women and movies and did not drink or do drugs. Xi was considered of only average intelligence, the professor said, and not as smart as the professor's peer group. Women thought Xi was "boring." The professor never felt completely relaxed around Xi, who seemed extremely "driven." Nevertheless, despite Xi's lack of popularity in the conventional sense and his "cold and calculating" demeanor in these early years, the professor said, Xi was "not cold-hearted." He was still considered a "good guy" in other ways. Xi was outwardly friendly, "always knew the answers" to questions, and would "always take care of you." The professor surmised that Xi's newfound popularity today, which the professor found surprising, must stem in part from Xi's being "generous and loyal." Xi also does not care at all about money and is not corrupt, the professor stated. Xi can afford to be incorruptible, the professor wryly noted, given that he was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. It is likely that Xi could, however, be "corrupted by power." BEIJING 00003128 005 OF 006 Xi's Political Instincts and Biases ----------------------------------- ¶21. (C) In the professor's view, Xi Jinping is supremely pragmatic, a realist, driven not by ideology but by a combination of ambition and "self-protection." The professor saw Xi's early calculations to carefully lay out a realistic career path as an illustration of his pragmatism. The most permanent influences shaping Xi's worldview were his princeling pedigree and formative years growing up with families of first-generation CCP revolutionaries in Beijing's elite residential compounds. These influences were amplified by Xi's decision in his early twenties to join the CCP and then the PLA. Xi solidified these views and values during his subsequent very successful 30-year career as a Party official, the professor concluded. ¶22. (C) Xi is a true "elitist" at heart, according to the professor, and believes that rule by a dedicated and committed Communist Party leadership is the key to enduring social stability and national strength, as in the (self-perceived) elite-dominated society of his youth, knit together by family ties, elders and male authority. After years of conversations with Xi, and having shared a common upbringing with him, the professor said, he is convinced that Xi has a genuine sense of "entitlement," believing that members of his generation are the "legitimate heirs" to the revolutionary achievements of their parents and therefore "deserve to rule China." For this reason, the professor maintained, Xi could never be a "true member" of current President Hu Jintao's camp, even if Xi did not give any indication of opposition to Hu Jintao now. Xi and other first-generation princelings derisively refer to people with non-Party, non-elite, commercial backgrounds like Hu Jintao as "shopkeepers' sons," whose parents did not fight and die for the revolution and therefore do not deserve positions of power. ¶23. (C) Xi knows how very corrupt China is and is repulsed by the all-encompassing commercialization of Chinese society, with its attendant nouveau riche, official corruption, loss of values, dignity, and self-respect, and such "moral evils" as drugs and prostitution, the professor stated. The professor speculated that if Xi were to become the Party General Secretary, he would likely aggressively attempt to address these evils, perhaps at the expense of the new moneyed class. ¶24. (C) Xi at one point early in his career was quite taken with Buddhist mysticism, according to the professor. In comments Xi made to the professor, including during the professor's visit to Xiamen while Xi was serving as an official there, Xi displayed a fascination with Buddhist martial arts, qigong, and other mystical powers said to aid health, as well as with Buddhist sacred sites such as Wutaishan. The professor said he does not know whether Xi was actually religious, or whether he was simply looking for a way to aid his health and well-being. Regardless, the professor said, he was extremely surprised by how much Xi knew about the subject and Xi's seeming belief in supernatural forces. Familiarity with the West and Taiwan ------------------------------------ ¶25. (C) Based on personal experience, the professor noted, Xi is very familiar with the West, with a sister in Canada, an ex-wife in England, a brother in Hong Kong, many friends overseas, and prior travel to the United States. As far as the professor can discern, Xi's family and friends have had a good experience in the West. The professor contrasted Xi's experience and attitudes toward the West with those of people sent to the United States by their work units, such as the nationalist and sometime anti-U.S. Tsinghua University scholar Yan Xuetong. Xi was the only one of his immediate family to stay behind in China, the professor noted, speculating that Xi knew early on that he would "not be special" outside of China. ¶26. (C) Xi is favorably disposed toward the United States, the professor maintained, and would want to maintain good relations with Washington. The professor said Xi has "no ambition" to "confront" the United States. During Xi's visit to Washington, D.C., in 1987, he told the professor that he had no strong impressions of the United States. Although Xi was not particularly impressed by the United States, he had nothing bad to say about it either. Xi took a detached stance, as if observing from a distance, viewing what he saw as just a normal part of life, not strange, the professor said. BEIJING 00003128 006 OF 006 ¶27. (C) Xi also knows Taiwan and the Taiwan people very well, the professor said, noting that Xi was in Fujian province for more than twenty years. Attracting Taiwan investment to Fujian was an important part of his accomplishments as a Xiamen official. HUNTSMAN

Politics in China Turning Violent?

There is online chatter that two separate car accident incidents in Beijing have hospitalized both Hu Guochang and Xi Jinping. The accidents occurred within hours of each other on the day Xi Jinping was to meet with Hillary Clinton, September 4, 2012. The first accident involved two jeeps hitting Xi Jinping's car. Hours later the more serious driving accident involved Hu Guochang. Hu Guochang headed the investigation into Bo Xilai. Why Xi Jinping would be a target is less obvious. Both men remain in the 301 army hospital five days after their accidents. The blogs make these incidents sound like attempts at punishing the establishment by army elements loyal to Bo Xilai. The articles suggest that Bo Xilai wanted to get at Hu Jintao but Hu was too well protected so he went after Xi Jinping instead. Both Xi Jinping and Hu Guochang are two of China's future seven rulers. Pretty serious if there is something to the speculations. Once politics are allowed to involve overt violence, the rules of the Party would no longer favor intelligence and diplomacy. Cunning and brutality would be accorded higher value. This new political paradigm would distract leaders from economic matters, and it would make reform more difficult as angered officials and power centers would have the precedent of resorting to violence. It would add another layer of complexity to a government already very hard to predict.

Decentralisation of payments

At Beijing's foremost university of traditional medicines there is a hospital. At a recent visit I was surprised to see the doctor now has an attending nurse who collects payments inside his examination room. In the past the patient always carried a slip of paper to a cashier down the hall, returning with the paper stamped to indicate receipt of payment. Now there is no stamp and the nurse even accepted a payment in advance of our future visit. She said we would not have to wait in line at the window to receive a number. I felt guilty experiencing the decentralization of payments at this prestigious hospital, but did not question the nurse as to why they had adopted this new custom. This isn't just any hospital, either, but one of only two hospitals in the country in which qigong treatment is sanctioned. While there a friend and first time visitor to China had a rib, a spinal disc, and a disjointed hip reset over the course of an hour while also receiving successful acupuncture for a headache that has plagued him for years. Watching this doctor go about his work professionally, I couldn't stop wondering what might have changed since the last time I was here such that doctors now no longer allow the hospital to be paid for their services. Was the doctor not getting paid? Or is this how the doctor has negotiated an increase in his wages? It has been suggested in some writings that as economic growth in China slows, provinces may begin to withhold tax revenue from the central government. Macau did this in 2008 and the central government responded by refusing to grant visas for Chinese gamblers to visit the Macau administrative region. Tax payments resumed, and all was soon forgotten. Leaving the hospital I thought of the way China's practices and customs are often surprisingly similar at the highest levels of diplomacy and at the bread seller on the corner. So my question is could the decentralization of payments be happening at all levels in China? That it is happening in hospitals is news enough...

Xi Jiping

Thought his wife was a property developer. Many relations have Canadian citizenship. But this makes one think he will have both potential influence over the military and be influenced by them. this in August: Mr. Xi, 59, is the “princeling” son of a revered Communist guerrilla leader who grew up in Beijing with military families. He is stepping into the leadership role with closer military relationships than anyone since Deng Xiaoping. “When those from the ‘red second generation’ move up, there will be a personal feeling, a traditional bond,” a senior officer said. Mr. Xi’s first job was as an aide to Geng Biao, a guerrilla comrade of his father’s who became China’s defense minister in 1981. Mr. Xi later held political command offices over military units while serving as a civilian leader in Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces opposite Taiwan, which China still considers part of its country. And he is married to Peng Liyuan, a celebrity singer from an army performance troupe who holds the equivalent rank of major general. Even before taking his post on the military commission, Mr. Xi had occasional informal meetings in Beijing with several generals, including the outspoken princelings Liu Yuan and Liu Yazhou, according to Li Mingjiang, an expert in Chinese politics now in Singapore. ..... Liu Yuan (no relation to Liu Yazhou), another powerful figure in Mr. Xi’s network of princeling generals, is the son of Liu Shaoqi, who had been picked by Mao to take over the post of supreme leader before being purged and left to die in prison. In an essay published in 2002, Mr. Xi reminisced about how he bonded with Liu Yuan when they were both given county-level civilian postings in 1982. “We agreed with each other even before we talked,” Mr. Xi wrote. “Both of us wanted to take the road of integrating with workers and peasants.” ..... (nyt.e.wong.20120807)